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During the past decade, the U.S. policy of conducting
extraterritorial "Targeted Killings" against individuals linked with
terrorist activities has been met with skepticism and scrutiny.
However, while the strikes have followed transnational terrorists
targeted by the United States into sovereign States such as
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia, the United States has
consistently denied any illegality, with reference to the "war against
Al-Qaeda," and their right to self-defense in the wake of 9/11. This
article evaluates the U.S. legal justifications for drone strikes with
reference to the highly controversial case of Anwar Al-Aulaqi, a U.S.Yemeni citizen killed by a Predator drone on September 30, 2011,
following his identification by the United States as a senior
operational leader of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).
Previous academic scrutiny has focused on justifying the killing
within the "hostilities" paradigm of International Humanitarian Law
(IHL), however this article submits that the case is instead governed
by the "law enforcement" paradigm, and the stricter regime of
International Human Rights Law (IHRL). Furthermore, previous
scrutiny has been largely confined to hypothesizing prior to the killing
itself. This two-part article will evaluate and apply the lex lata of
international law in the circumstances prevailing during the strike.
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The methodology adopted involves first analyzing the United
States' legal justifications, before investigating the frameworks of jus
ad bellum, jus in bello and IHRL, thus aiming to paint a complete
picture of the legality of U.S. action. It is clear from the analysis that
all three legal frameworks are facing tremendous pressure to evolve in
response to the unpredictable nature of terrorist threats. However,
progressive approaches to entrenched legal principles mostly fail in
finding the necessary support to crystallize.
In relation to jus ad bellum, the traditional paradigm of regulating
purely inter-state relations is being eroded to justify extraterritorial
operations against non- state actors under the right of anticipatory selfdefense. However, the strike against Al-Aulaqi appears to cross the
threshold into the unlawful realms of pre-emptive self-defense. In
relation to jus in bello, the entrenched geographical limitation
confining non-international armed conflict to a single state precludes
the United States successfully invoking a global non-international
armed conflict with Al-Qaeda. Furthermore, the paucity of bilateral
fighting in the state of Yemen between AQAP and the United States
precludes establishing a localized non-international armed conflict. It
is further clear that the United States' rationale for the strike was not
to aid the Yemeni government, but to protect U.S. persons and
interests. As such, IHRL must be applied based on the extraterritorial
application of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR). Under this framework, there are strong arguments to find
both that the United States' position rejecting the extraterritorial
application of the ICCPR is misplaced, and that the strict concept of
absolute necessity renders the strike unlawful.
The key underlying theme spanning all three legal frameworks is
a paucity of publicly known information, compounded by decisions
regarding the non-justiciability of targeting decisions. Consequently,
this has resulted in a distinct lack of accountability, and this author
submits that to inject legitimacy into the U.S. policy, reform is
unquestionably required.

INTRODUCTION

"' [T]argeted killing' denotes the use of lethal force attributable to
a subject of international law with the intent, premeditation and
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deliberation to kill individually selected persons who are not in the
physical custody of those targeting them."'
"Targeted killing" is a concept that has developed throughout
history,2 and has no settled definition. 3 The above quote represents
the current conception of the phenomenon, as posited by International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Legal Advisor Nils Melzer, and
endorsed both throughout academia 4 and by the UN Special
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions.5
Targeted killings were historically shrouded with secrecy and of
doubtful legality; however, the world is currently witnessing the
"current trend toward legitimization," 6 with jurisdictions such as the
United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Switzerland, and Israel
openly admitting to such policies. 7 The emergence of such practices
into a realm of quasi-accountability has received considerable scrutiny
from both academia 8 and the UN. 9 This article contributes to the
1. NILS MELZER, TARGETED KILLING IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (1st ed. 2008).
2. "Targeted killing" has been known by a variety of names, such as,
assassination, political murder, and tyrannicide. Id. at 9. "Targeted killings" do not
originate from a treaty or statute. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or
Arbitrary Executions, Study on Targeted Killings, Int'l Law Comm'n, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/14/24/Add. 6, 3 (May 28, 2010) (by Philip Alston) [hereinafter Alston].
3. See MELZER, supra note 1, at 5 n.8 (noting that a number of various
definitions promulgate academic literature).
4. Meagan S. Wong, Comment, Targeted Killings and the International
Legal Framework: With Particular Reference to the US Operation against
Osama Bin Laden, 11 CJIL 127, 128 (2012); Benjamin R. Farley, Targeting
Anwar Al-Aulaqi: A Case Study in U.S. Drone Strikes and TargetedKilling, 2
AM. UNIV. NAT'L SEC. L. BRIEF 57, 60 (2012); GEOFFREY ROBERTSON QC,
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: THE STRUGGLE FOR GLOBAL JUSTICE 641 (4th ed.

2012).
5. Alston, supra note 2.
6. MELZER, supra note 1, at 9.
7. See generally MELZER, supra note 1, ch. 2, for a comprehensive
discussion of the current trend towards legitimization.
8. See generally MELZER,
supra note
1;
NOAM
LUBELL,
EXTRATERRITORIAL USE OF FORCE AGAINST NON-STATE ACTORS (1st ed.
2010); TARGETED KILLINGS: LAW AND MORALITY IN AN ASYMMETRICAL

WORLD (Claire Finkelstein, et al. eds., 2012).
9. See Press Release, Officer of the High Commissioner, UN CounterTerrorism Expert to launch inquiry into the civilian impact of drones and other
forms of targeted killing, U.N. Press Release (Jan. 22, 2013) (reporting that the
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debate surrounding arguably the most controversial policy
promulgated by any state: the U.S. policy of drone strikes.
The modemlo U.S. policy of targeted killing can be traced to the
horrific acts of terrorism perpetrated on 9/11.11 This policy acts as a
weapon in the U.S. arsenal in combating terrorism worldwide. The
policy has revolved around the use of drones (or "Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles")1 2 equipped with two Hellfire missiles.13 These drones are
controlled from thousands of miles away by the U.S. Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA). 14 The CIA uses drones to launch attacks
against individuals in foreign states who are added to a confidential
"kill list."" Controversially, this "kill list" has extended to the

UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and Counter-Terrorism, Ben
Emmerson, launched an inquiry into the civilian impact of drones and other forms
of targeted killing).
10. "Modem" refers to the fact that the United States has conducted various
forms oftargeted killings since at least World War II, with administration officials
repeatedly citing the example of shooting down Japanese Admiral Yamamoto.
See Eric Holder, U.S. Attorney General, Attorney Genemal Eric Holder Speaks at
Northwestern University School of Law (March 5, 2012) available at
John
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech-1203051 .html;
Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism,
The Ethics and Efficacy of the President's Counterterrorism Strategy (Apr. 30,
2012)
available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/04/brennanspeech/
[hereinafter Ethics and Efficacy].
11. Almost three thousand innocent people died in the combined terrorist
attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001. 9/11 COMM'N REPORT:
FINAL REPORT OF THE NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED

STATES, at 552, n.188 (July 22, 2004).
12. The United States has conducted targeted killings via other methods, such
as the assault on Osama Bin Laden's compound on May 2, 2011, carried out by
Navy SEALS, which resulted in Bin Laden's death. Such occurrences are outside
this article's scope, but see Marko Milanovic, Was the Killing of Osama Bin Laden
Lawful?, EJIL: Talk!, May 2, 2011, for an interesting and brief analysis of its
legality.
13. See Thomas M. McDonnell, Sow What You Reap? Using Predator and
Reaper Drones to Carry Out Assassinations or Targeted Killings of Suspected
Islamic Terrorists,44 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 243, 251-55 (2012).

14. Jo Becker and Scott Shane, Secret 'Kill List' Proves A Test of Obama's
Principlesand Will, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2012.
15. Id.
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Anwar Al-

Aulaqi.16
The killing of Al-Aulaqi is the focal point for this article. AlOriginally a
Aulaqi was a U.S.-born Imam residing in Yemen."
prolific Al-Qaeda propagandist,' 8 the United States added Al-Aulaqi
to its "kill list" 19 after his role allegedly evolved from inspirational to
operational. 2 0 Shortly after the United States added Al-Aulaqi to its
"kill list," the UN identified Al-Aulaqi as a known associate of AlQaeda in July 2010.21 The UN identified Al-Aulaqi as an Al-Qaeda
associate for two reasons:22 first, for his role in training the failed
Detroit Christmas Day shoe-bomber Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab,2 3
and second, because of his general involvement in "setting the
strategic direction of AQAP." 24 This included recruiting, training, and
planning attacks beyond the Arabian Peninsula.2 5 After a failed
attempt on his life on May 5, 2011,26 a U.S. drone strike killed AlAulaqi on September 30, 2011.27 Samir Khan, also a U.S. citizen, was

16. Tom Leonard, Barack Obama Orders Killing of US Cleric Anwar AlAwlaki, THE TELEGRAPH, Apr. 7, 2010.
17. Obituary: Anwar al-Awlaki, BBC NEWS, Sept. 30, 2011 [hereinafter
Obituary].
18. Id.
19. Leonard, supra note 16. The United States added Al-Aulaqi to its "kill
list" on April 6, 2010. Id.
20. Al-Awlaki was previously described as "inspirational rather than
operational." Bobby Ghosh, How Dangerous is the Cleric Anwar Al-Awlaki?, TIME,
Jan. 13, 2010.
21. U.N. Al-Qaeda Sanctions Comm., Narrative Summaries of Reasons for
Listing, U.N. Doc. QI.A.283.10 (July 20, 2010) [hereinafter Sanctions Comm.].
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. The United States labeled Al-Aulaqi as a senior operational leader
of Al-Qaeda. See Elizabeth R. Wilcox (ed.), Office of the Legal Advisor, U.S. Dept.
of State, Dig. of U.S. Practicein Int'lLaw 176 (2010).
26. Margaret Coker et al., Drone Targets Yemeni Cleric, WSJ, May 7, 2011.
27. Martin Chulov, Al-Qaida cleric Anwar al-Awlaki is dead, says Yemen, THE
GUARDIAN, Sept. 30, 2011. Obituary, supra note 17 (reporting that a CIA
controlled drone carried out the strike against Al-Aulaqi's jeep in a remote part of
Yemen).
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killed in the same strike. 28 Two weeks later, Al-Aulaqi's son, 16-year
old Abdulrahman, was killed in another U.S. drone strike. 29
After these drone attacks, the global community pressured the
United States to justify its actions. 30 As a result of this pressure, the
U.S. legal justifications for adding an individual to its kill list were
revealed. These revelations have not always been voluntary. 3' For
example, in February 2013 a Department of Justice White Paper was
leaked to the public.3 2 Whether from an administration-approved
briefing or a government leak, these revelations present a picture of a
government willing to add an individual to the "kill list" who poses an
"imminent" threat to United States persons or interests.
This article provides an analysis of the legality of the targeted
killing of Al-Aulaqi on the basis of the lex lata of international law.
The basis of the analysis is the U.S. administration's legal
justifications and the reported facts surrounding the strike. While
U.S. justifications can be delineated into domestic and international
law, this article focuses solely on the latter, except where overlap is
necessary.33

28. Khan was the editor of Inspire, the English language magazine published
by AQAP. Saeed Kamali Dehghan, Samir Khan Named as Second US Citizen to
Die in DroneStrike, THE GUARDIAN, Sept. 30, 2011.

29. Finn and Browning, An American Teenager in Yemen: Payingfor the
Sins ofHis Father?,TIME, Oct. 27, 2011.
30. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, US: END CIA DRONE ATTACKS (Dec.

19, 2011).
31. However, there have been a number of public addresses from
administration officials in an attempt to show some transparency. See, e.g., Harold
Koh speaks at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law,
25,
2010),
http://www.state.gov/s/l/
D.C.
(Mar.
Washington
releases/remarks/139119.htm.
32. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, WHITE PAPER, LAWFULNESS OF A LETHAL
OPERATION DIRECTED AGAINST A U.S. CITIZEN WHO IS A SENIOR OPERATIONAL

LEADER OF AL-QA'IDA OR AN ASSOCIATED FORCE (2011) [hereinafter DOJ White

Paper], available at http://www.justice.gov/oip/docs/dept-white-paper.pdf.
33. Therefore, this article does not consider whether the strike was a breach
of the U.S. Presidential ban on assassinations, prohibited under Executive Order
12333. Similarly, this article does not consider whether the strike against AlAulaqi was constitutional. For discussion of these issues see, for example,
Robert Delahunty & Christopher Motz, Killing Al-Awlaki: The Domestic Legal
Issues (2011) U. ST. THOMAS, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 11-38.
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The applicable framework of international law when considering
the legality of "targeted killings" is highly debatable.3 4 The Special
Rapporteur recently concluded that, "the result has been the
displacement of clear legal standards with a vaguely defined license to
kill, and the creation of a major accountability vacuum." 35
Notwithstanding such difficulties, a paradigm of analysis must be
constructed to provide the parameters of investigation in this article.
The starting point is that any extraterritorial targeted killing
occurring in a foreign State triggers the rules regarding inter-state
force (hereinafter 'jus ad bellum"). Consequently, in the case of AlAulaqi, it must firstly be analyzed whether the strike was consistent
with the sovereignty of Yemen. A "robust" self-defense analysis of
targeted killings would end the inquiry after a successful finding that
the rules of jus ad bellum have received compliance. 36 However, such
a view finds nominal support 37 and fails to take into account the
possibility of multiple layers of responsibility that may result from an
unlawful killing under the frameworks of jus ad bellum, jus in bello
and International Human Rights Law. 38
Moving forward, the law, and predictably the opinion of jurists,
diverge. To adopt the reasoning of Melzer, there are two primary
paradigms under which the legality of "targeted killings" may be
analyzed: the "law enforcement paradigm" and the "hostilities
paradigm." 39 The former has traditionally spoken to domestic "shoot-

34. JENNIFER ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., Legal Issues Related to the

Lethal Targeting of U.S. Citizens Suspected of Terrorist Activities (2012).
35. Alston, supranote 2, at 3.
36. Kenneth Anderson, Targeted Killing in U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy
and Law (Brookings Inst., Working Paper 2009).
37. JORDAN PAUST, SELF-DEFENSE TARGETINGS OF NON-STATE ACTORS
AND PERMISSIBILITY OF U.S. USE OF

DRONES IN PAKISTAN, 19 J. TRANSNAT'L L.

& POL'Y 237, 241-42 (2010).
38.

See JAMES CRAWFORD,

ILC ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY:

INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND COMMENTARIES, 166-67 (2002) ("that is not to say
that self-defense precludes the wrongfulness of conduct in all cases or with
respect to all obligations. Examples relate to international humanitarian law and
human rights obligations ... As to obligations under international humanitarian
law and in relation to non-derogable human rights provisions, self-defence does
not preclude the wrongfulness of conduct.").
39. MELZER, supra note 1, at 44.
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to-kill" 40 and "final rescue shot" 4 1 policies, where the sole operative
body of law is IHRL. The latter traditionally speaks to the rules
governing the existence and regulation of armed conflicts, known
collectively as the rules ofjus in bello. However, against the backdrop
of globalization and the ever-increasing universality of rights, the
clear division between "law enforcement" and "hostilities" has been
eroded. 42 The resulting concept of Melzer's "normative paradigm of
hostilities" reflects the consensus that IHRL maintains applicability,
subject to the lex specialis rule, during times of armed conflict. 43 In
the case of Al-Aulaqi, an underlying problem which has divided
academics is whether to classify the strike in the context of "law
enforcement" 44 or as part of an armed conflict and thus under the
"hostilities" paradigm. 45
The underlying argument forwarded is that it is ultimately the
frameworks ofjus ad bellum and IHRL that are applicable to the strike
against Al-Aulaqi. 4 6 The methodology adopted in this two-part article
involves setting out the U.S. legal position in Chapter I, before
considering all three aforementioned international legal frameworks in
Chapters II-IV. Part I covers Chapters I-II, while Part II will follow
with Chapters III-IV, before providing an overall conclusion on the
strike's legality. In doing so, this article aims not only to provide a
complete analysis under international law, but also to contribute to the
debate surrounding the death of Al-Aulaqi by considering the new
arguments voiced in the DOJ White Paper, alongside arguments
surrounding the applicability of IHRL that have yet to receive the
40. MELZER, supra note 1, at 22.
41. Id. at 10, 18.
42. The International Court of Justice. has held that the IHRL was applicable
in times of both war and peace. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, T 104106 (July 9) [hereinafter "Wall Advisory Opinion"].
43. MELZER, supra note 1, at 243.
44. See, e.g., Michael Ramsden, Targeted Killings and International
Human Rights Law: The Case of Anwar Al-Awlaki, 16(2) J. CONFLICT & SEC.
LAw 385 (2011).
45. See, e.g., Farley, supra note 4, at 57.
46. As such, the substantive rules of IHL are outside this article's scope. See
Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Customary Int'l HumanitarianLaw (2005) (JeanMarie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck) for a comprehensive study of
customary IHL completed by the ICRC.
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necessary academic scrutiny. Furthermore, because the majority of
the academic debate surrounding the targeting of Al-Aulaqi predates the incident itself,47 new arguments must be considered
regarding the application of the law in the circumstances prevailing at
the time of death. It may indeed be true that the U.S. drone strikes are
"establishing precedents that other nations may follow." 48 However,
if precedents are indeed being established, it is crucial that they are
established in conformity with the fundamental principles of
international law so the world avoids the last century's mistakes.4 9
I. FROM "THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR" TO "THE WAR AGAINST
AL-QAEDA": AN ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. LEGAL JUSTIFICATIONS
We are a nation at war . .. But just as surely as we are a nation at
war, we also are a nation of laws and values.5 0

In analyzing the legality of the targeted killing of Anwar AlAulaqi, Chapter I considers the legal justifications that the U.S.
Administration uses as authority for the strike. In doing so, this
chapter considers both the domestic and international justifications in
light of the recently leaked DOJ White Paper, 5 ' alongside remarks
from the previous two U.S. administrations, to paint a complete
picture of how the United States has developed its current position on
targeted killing.
The most authoritative source of U.S. legal justification is the
leaked DOJ White Paper, which outlines "the circumstances in which
the U.S. government can use lethal force in a foreign country outside
the area of active hostilities against a U.S. citizen who is a senior
operational leader of Al-Qaeda or an associated force." 52 In summary,

47. See, e.g., Ramsden, supra note 45; Robert Chesney, Who May Be
Killed? Anwar al-Awlaki as a Case Study in the InternationalLegal Regulation
ofLethal Force, 13 Y.B. INT'L HUMANITARIANL. 3-60 (2010).

48. Ethics and Efficacy, supra note 10.
49. McDonnell, supra note 13, at 245 (noting that 1.5 million civilian casualties
resulted from indiscriminate bombing in WW2).
50. Holder, supra note 10.
51. DOJ White Paper, supra note 32.
52. Id. at 1.
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three cumulative conditions must be met before lethal force can be
used:
(1) an informed, high-level official of the U.S. government has
determined that the targeted individual poses an imminent threat of
violent attack against the United States;
(2) capture is infeasible, and the United States continues to
monitor whether capture becomes feasible; and
(3) the operation would be conducted in a manner consistent with
applicable law of war principles. 53
In enunciating this three-stage test, the United States justifies its
policy with numerous domestic and international authorities and
doctrines.
A. Domestic Justification
The primary source of domestic authority cited on numerous 54
occasions by the United States is the Authorization for Use of Military
Force (AUMF).ss The AUMF provides:
That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate
force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that
occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or
persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international
terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or
persons. 56
Consideration of the AUMF is integral to examining IHRL.
However, this article does not include further consideration of
domestic authorities, such as the legal effects of U.S. citizenship and
constitutional rights. Nevertheless, it must briefly be noted that the
U.S. standpoint is that neither citizenship5 7 nor the Due Process
53. DOJ White Paper, supra note 32, at 1; See also Holder, supra note 10.
54. Harold Koh, supra note 31; Holder, supra note 10.
55. Passed by Congress within one week of 9/11. Authorization for Use of
Military Force, PL 107-40 [S.J. Res 23].
56. Id. § 2(a).
57. "Belligerents who also happen to be U.S. citizens do not enjoy immunity
where non-citizen belligerents are valid military objectives." Jeh Johnson, Nat'l Sec.
L., Lawyers and Lawyering in the Obama Admin., speech to Yale Law School (Feb.
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Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution5 8 prevent the
strike against Al-Aulaqi.5 9
B. InternationalJustification
The United States recognizes that "targeted killings" cannot be
considered a purely domestic affair outside the scope of international
law. 60 Consequently, the United States also justifies its practice of
"targeted killings" under international law. Underlying these
international justifications, the United States has acknowledged the
difficulties of formulating foreign policy in light of the challenges
posed by Al-Qaeda.61 The United States has repeatedly reaffirmed its
commitment to the rule of law 62 and conventional legal principles 63 in
meeting those challenges.
The U.S. international justifications can be analyzed under the
methodology promulgated by John Brennan in his speech at the
Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars. 64 Brennan
suggested that "targeted killings" should be used because they are
legal, ethical, and wise. 6 5 While wisdom is a question devoid of legal
significance for present purposes, 6 6 the legality and ethicality of
22, 2012), http://www.cfr.org/national-security-and-defense/jeh-johnsons-speechnational-security-law-lawyers-lawyering-obama-administration/p27448.
58. The clause provides, inter alia, that "No person shall be ... deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." However, Attorney General
Holder has stated that due process does not equal judicial process. Holder, supra
note 10.
59. Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C., 2010) (noting that this
issue is non-justiciable).
60. U.N. Charter art. 2, para 7.
61. Koh, supra note 31 (drawing an analogy with "driving the roundabout
near the Coliseum in Rome").
62. Id. (citing President Barack Obama, A Just and Lasting Peace, Nobel
Lecture
in
Oslo,
(Dec.
10,
2009),
http://www.nobelprize.org/
nobel-prizes/peace/laureates/2009/obama-lecture-en.html).
63. Johnson, supra note 58.
64. Ethics and Efficacy, supra note 10.
65. Id.
66. Although it is accepted that wisdom may be a pertinent consideration in
theories of compliance with international legal obligations. See, e.g., Andrew T.
Guzman, A Compliance Based Theory of InternationalLaw, 90 CAL. L. REV.
1823 (2002).
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targeted killings can be equated to the legal frameworks of Jus ad
Bellum and Jus in Bello, respectively.
1. Legal - Jus ad Bellum

"The jus ad bellum (law on the use of force) or jus contra bellum
(law on the prevention of war) seeks to limit resort to force between
States." 6 7 Under this legal framework, the United States accepts that
there are limits to extra-territorial force regarding state sovereignty
that must be observed. 68 Therefore, the United States has justified its
actions under its "inherent right to national self-defense in
international law" under Article 51 of the UN Charter, 69 resulting
from the "undisputed act of aggression" perpetrated by Al-Qaeda on
9/11.70 However, as a framework professing to govern the recourse to
force between States, Chapter II addresses whether self-defense may
be invoked against non-state actors.
Assuming Article 51 of the UN Charter justifies U.S. action
against non-state actors, the U.S. interpretation of the parameters of
self-defense has bred controversy, with Brennan acknowledging that
the legality of U.S. drone strikes under jus as bellum rests on the
definition of "imminence." 7 1 No aspect of U.S. policy has proved
more controversial than the conception of "imminence" promulgated
under the "Bush Doctrine" of pre-emptive self-defense. 72 The "Bush

67. Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, IHL and other legal regimes - jus ad
bellum andjus in bello,,ICRC.ORG (Oct. 29 2010), http://www.icrc.org/eng/war-andlaw/ihl-other-legal-regmies/jus-in-bello-jus-ad-bellum/overview-jus-ad-bellum-jusin-bello.htm [hereinafter IHL and other legal regimes].
68. Johnson, supra note 57.
69. DOJ White Paper, supra note 32, at 2 (citing U.N. Charter, art. 51)
(also justifying the targeted killings of Americans in foreign countries on the
President's "constitutional responsibility to protect the nation"). Id.
70. John Brennan, Strengthening our Security by Adhering to our Values and
Laws (Sept. 16, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/16/
remarks-john-o-brennan-strengthening-our-security-adhering-our-values-an.
7 1. Id.
72. HEIKO MEIERTONS, THE DOCTRINES OF U.S. SECURITY POLICY: AN
EVALUATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 179-224 (1st ed. 2010).
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Doctrine" formally emerged in the NSS published by the White House
just over a year after 9/11.73
The National Security Strategy provides, in pertinent part, that the

U.S. will disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations by ...
defending the United States, the American people and our interests
at home and abroad by identifying and destroying the threat before
it reaches our borders... we will not hesitate to act alone, if
necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting pre-

emptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm
against our people and our country.
While the 2010 NSS removed the phrase "pre-emptively," 75 the
Obama Administration has continued to promulgate a broad
conception of "imminence," most notably in the DOJ White Paper.
With regard to senior operational leaders like Al-Aulaqi, the DOJ
White Paper clarifies that "imminence" "does not require clear
evidence that a specific attack on U.S. persons and interests will take
place in the immediate future." 76 The United States cites the
unpredictable and sporadic nature of terrorist activities to support the
conclusion that the criterion of imminence can be fulfilled where an
individual is "an operational leader of Al-Qaeda or an associated force
and is personally and continually involved in planning terrorist attacks
against the United States."7 7 Additionally, an Al-Qaeda member

recently involved in activities posing an imminent threat of attack
against the U.S., and who has not renounced such activities, may be

73.

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 2002, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

ARCHIVE, http://nssarchive.us (last visited Mar. 30, 2013) [hereinafter "NSS 2002"].
The NSS is a document required, by the Goldwater-Nichols Act 1986, to be
submitted each year to Congress by the U.S. President to set out the U.S. foreign and
security policy for that year. President Obama has not submitted since 2010. Id.;
See also President George W. Bush, President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at
West Point (June 1, 2002), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/
news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html (President Bush enunciating the "Bush
Doctrine").
74. NSS 2002, supra note 74 (emphasis added).
75.

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 2010, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

ARCHIVE, http://nssarchive.us (last visited Mar. 30, 2013) [hereinafter "NSS 2010"].
76. DOJ White Paper, supra note 32, at 7.

77. Id. at 8.
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targeted. " Chapter II of this article addresses the legal validity of this
definition of imminence and its application to the Al-Aulaqi case.
Furthermore, the United States has also justified inter-State force
where either the territorial State consents to the force or "after a
determination that the nation is unable or unwilling to deal with a
threat to the United States." 79 The former justification was rightfully
unquestioned. However, academia questioned whether the UN
Charter supported the latter justification.8 0 Despite these reservations,
Brennan continued to rely on the latter justification to support U.S.
drone strikes in foreign States. 8 Additionally, the DOJ White Paper
appears to incorporate this justification into the inherent right of the
United States to self-defense. 82
2. Ethical - Jus in Bello
"[Jus in Bello] addresses the reality of a conflict without
considering the reasons or legality for using force. It regulates only
those aspects of the conflict which are of humanitarian concern." 83
First, it must be emphasized that the framework of jus in bello
operates separately to jus ad bellum; legality under the latter does not
equate to legality under the former.84 Jus in bello regulates the
situations where States can legitimately claim to be in an armed
conflict with an enemy. If an armed conflict can be established, then
the rules of IZHL must be applied. 5 The primary benefit 'associated
with triggering the applicability of IHL is that it provides a more

78. DOJ White Paper, supra note 32, at 8.
79. Holder, supra note 10.
80. Kevin Jon Heller, The "Unwilling or Unable" Standard for SelfDefense,
OPINIO
JURIS
(Sept.
17,
2011,
2:42
AM),
http://opiniojuris.org/2011/09/17/the-unwilling-or-unable-standard-for-selfdefense-against-non-state-actors/ (critiquing the first unofficial enunciation of
this policy).
81. Ethics and Efficacy, supra note 10.
82. DOJ White Paper, supra note 32, at 5.
83. IHL and other legal regimes, supra note 68.
84. Alston, supra note 2, at 12.
85. Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Defence Motion
for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 70 (Int'l Crim. Trib.1 for the Former
Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
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permissive framework to determine the legality of an operation.
Therefore, it is not surprising that the U.S. has attempted to
incorporate its campaign of drone strikes into the context of armed
conflict.
Initially, the United States supported drone strikes with the
assertion that they were part of the War on Terror. 86 However, the
United States claimed its War on Terror was not an international or
non-international armed conflict, which consequently denied
designated terrorists the invocation of protections afforded under the
Geneva Conventions. 87 The imprecise and non-legalistic terminology
of the War on Terror was criticized" and the rhetoric quickly shifted
to a "war with terrorist organizations" 89 or a "war with Al-Qaeda." 90
The Obama administration tried to avoid using such legally
uncertain phrases91 and adopted the position that the United States is
engaged in armed conflicts across Iraq, Afghanistan, and with the nonstate actor, Al-Qaeda. 92 The DOJ White Paper cites the U.S. Supreme
86. President George W. Bush, Address to a joint session of Congress (Sept.
20, 2001), http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript/. The War on
Terror began with the terrorist attacks against the U.S. on September 11, 2001.
Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Speaking before the American Bar
Assoc. Standing Committee on Law and Nat'1 Sec. 5 (Feb. 24, 2004)
http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2004/02/gonzales.pdf.
87. "Al Qaeda is an international terrorist group and cannot be considered a
state party to the Geneva Convention. Its members, therefore, are not covered by
the Geneva Convention, and are not entitled to POW status under the treaty."
Ari Fleischer, White House Press Secretary, Statement by the Press Secretary on
the
Geneva
Convention
(May
7,
2003)
http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030507-18.html.
88. See, e.g., Sean D. Murphy, InternationalLaw the United States, and the
Non-Military 'War'Against Terrorism, 14 E.J.I.L. 347-64 (2003).
89. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Forward to Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism at 1 (Feb.
1, 2006), http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2006-01-25-Strategic-Plan.pdf.
90. Gonzales, supra note 87, at 5.
91. Lubell, supra note 8, at 113 (citing Oliver Burkeman, Obama
Administration says goodbye to 'war on terror': US defence department seems to
confirm use of the bureaucraticphrase 'overseas contingency operations' THE
GUARDIAN, Mar. 25, 2009.
92. See Koh, supra note 31; DOJ White Paper, supra note 32; see also
NSS 2010, supra note 76, at 20 (stating that "this is not a global war against a
tactic-terrorism or a religion-Islam. We are at war with a specific network, al-
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Court's decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld to support the proposition
that the United States is "currently in a non-international armed
conflict with Al-Qaeda and its associated forces." 93 With this
justification, the White Paper rebukes arguments that the conflict
between the United States and Al-Qaeda cannot extend to nations
outside "hot" battlefields, such as Afghanistan. 9 4 The White Paper
states that while there is no authoritative precedent in international
law, 95 an operation against a senior operational leader of Al-Qaeda
in a location where [Al-Qaeda] or an associated force has a
significant and organized presence and from which al-Qa'ida. ..
plan[s] attacks against U.S. persons and interests, the operation
would be part of the non-international armed conflict between the
United States and al-Qa'ida that the Supreme Court mentioned in
Hamdan.96

Consequently, Chapter III will address the legitimacy of the claim that
the Al-Aulaqi strike was within the context of an armed conflict with
the stateless, shifting entity that is Al-Qaeda, subject to no
geographical boundaries.
3.

The Missing Link - IHRL

During the last 10 years, the United States has not considered that
drone strikes are outside the context of armed conflict, and are
therefore governed by IHRL's law enforcement paradigm. 97
Consequently, the United States has not considered the IHRL, even in
the recently leaked White Paper. 98 Chapter III of this article will

Qa'ida, and its terrorist affiliates who support efforts to attack the United States,
our allies, and partners").
93. DOJ White Paper, supra note 32, at 3 (citing Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548
U.S. 557, 628-31 (2006)).
94. Cf Mary Ellen O'Connell, Combatants and the Combat Zone, 43 U.
RICH. L. REv 845, 857-59 (2009).
95. DOJ White Paper, supra note 32, at 4.
96. Id. at 5.
97. ELSEA, supra note 34, at 20.
98. See David Kaye, InternationalLaw Issues in the Department ofJustice
White Paperon Targeted Killing, 17 AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L L. (Feb. 15,2013) available
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provide that despite the United States' lack of consideration, there are
strong arguments that the Al- Aulaqi killing was indeed outside of the
context of armed conflict, meaning that the United States must
consider the framework and application of IHRL.
The United States takes the position that the IHRL does not apply
to killings outside of the United States. 99 Yet, this argument is often
made and accepted without justification. Chapter IV will explore the
arguments underlying this position, before considering the application
of IHRL to the Al-Aulaqi strike.
C. Conclusion
The preceding analysis considered the U.S. domestic and legal
justifications for the targeted killing policy. It is clear that, in matters
such as the U.S. conception of "imminence" and the geographical
reach of armed conflict, the United States is proposing interpretations
that are progressive and in response to the fluid challenge of terrorism
perpetrated by transnational non-state actors. However, the following
chapters consider whether such interpretations are reconcilable with
the lex lata of each framework. After constructing each framework,
the focus turns to the application to the Al-Aulaqi killing.
II. JUS AD BELLUM: SELF-DEFENSE AND THE
SOVEREIGNTY OF YEMEN

After considering the legal justifications put forth by the United
States, the second stage in analyzing the targeted killing of Anwar AlAulaqi is to establish that the incursion into the sovereign territory of
Yemen was justifiable under the rules of jus ad bellum. This chapter
considers the fundamental prohibition of the use of inter-State force
and explores the options for legitimizing force, specifically focusing
on the U.S. legal justification, the inherent right of national selfdefense.
at
http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/17/issue/8/intemational-law-issuesdepartment-justice-white-paper-targeted-killing.
99. Kevin Jon Heller, 'One Hell of a Killing Machine': Signature Strikes
and International Law, 89 J. INT'L CRIM. JUSTICE 89, 112 (2013); Arabella
Thorpe, Drone Attacks and the Killing ofAnwar Al-Aulaqi, House of Commons
Standard Note 06165 13 (Dec. 20, 2011).
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A. Prohibitionon the Use ofForce
The cardinal rule of jus ad bellum' 00 is that "[States] shall refrain
in their international relations from the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations."' 0 '
Under a literal reading, there may be the temptation to argue that
"short swift operations not involving prolonged presence ... do not
interfere with the territorial integrity or the political independence [of
Yemen],"l 0 2 thus rendering the drone strike against Al-Aulaqi lawful.
However, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has repeatedly
rejected such a narrow literal reading10 3 and could be deemed contrary
to the object and purpose of the UN Charter,104 leading to the strong
and dominant viewpoint that all force is primafacie unlawful. 0 5
An extraterritorial use of force in another sovereign state may
only be legitimized by the State's consent 06 or the Charter's
exceptions, namely the exercise of self-defense 07 or with Security
Council authorization.' 0 8
100. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14,
190 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua]; Reports of the
Commission to the General Assembly, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with
Commentaries 187, 247 (1966); CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE

USE OF FORCE 49 (3d ed. 2008) (as enunciated in U.N. Charter, art. 2, para. 4 and
subsequently confirmed as a principle of customary international law andjus cogen
norm).
101. U.N. Charter, art. 2, para. 4.
102. Lubell, supra note 8, at 27 (emphasis added).
103. Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 24 (Apr. 9);
202-205.
Nicaragua, supra note 101, at 106-08,
104. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31, May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331. The "object and purpose" of the U.N. Charter is "to maintain
international peace and security." U.N. Charter, art. 1, para. 1.
105.

YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF DEFENCE (5th ed.,

Cambridge University Press, 2011), 89-90; Lubell, supra note 8, at 27-28;
Malcolm Shaw, InternationalLaw (6th ed. 2008), 1127; JAMES CRAWFORD,
BROWNLIE'S PRINCIPLES OF PUB INT'L L 747 (8th ed.) [hereinafter BROWNLIE'S].

106. Accepted by the ICJ in Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo
(Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2005, p. 168, p. 198-99
[hereinafter Armed Activities].
107. U.N. Charter, at art. 51.
108. Id., art. 42.
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It is accepted that there is a remote possibility that consent was
given, especially noting the various forms of aid the United States
provided to Yemen since 2006.109 However, neither the United States
nor Yemen has publically indicated 1 o that Yemen consented to the
strike.'
Furthermore, the argument that UN Security Council'
Resolutions 1368 and 1373 authorized the perpetual unilateral use of
force in all States where terrorists are present" 2 faces skepticism
throughout academia." 3 Additionally, this argument arguably seeks
to undermine the raison d'itre of Article 2(4), namely the nonproliferation of force." 4 Therefore, the following discussion focuses
on the primary justification forwarded by the United States: that the
strike was justified under the U.S.' inherent right of self-defense.
B. Self-Defense
Article 51 of the UN Charter states that:

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council

109. JEREMY SHARP, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., RL34170, Yemen: Background

and U.S. Relations 12-20 (2012).
110. Alston recommends that to legitimize a targeted killing by consent,
there must be a public indication by the territorial State. Alston, supra note 2, at
27.
111. Thorp, supra note 100, at 9. It should also be noted that the U.S.
supported Gulf-Cooperation Council brokered transition plan following the
"Arab Spring" was only entered 2 months after the killing of Al-Aulaqi. SHARP,
supra note 109, at 4.
112. Jordan Paust, Use of Armed Force Against Terrorists in Afghanistan,
Iraqand Beyond, 35 CORNELL INT'L L.J. (2002) 533, 544-45 [hereinafter Use of
Armed Force].
113. Michael Byers, Terrorism, the Use of Force and International Law
after 11 September, 51 ICLQ 401, 402, 412 (2002); Chris Downes, 'Targeted
Killings' in an Age of Terror: The Legality of the Yemen Strike, 9 J. CONFLICT &
SECURITY L. 277,286-87 (2004); McDonnell, supra note 13, at 269.
114. Albrecht Randelzhofer & Oliver Dorr, Article 2(4), in THE CHARTER OF
THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 200, 215-16 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 3d

ed. 2012).
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has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security.115
Jus ad bellum is traditionally a framework governing inter-state
relations, but has been used by the United States since 9/11 to support
its use of force against non-state actors, namely Al-Qaeda. This
application has resulted in a deep "doctrinal divide"ll 6 between those
favoring a traditional, restrictive approach to self-defense, based in
Article 51,117 and those advocating a progressive, wider approach,
drawing support from the parallel doctrine of self-defense under
customary international law to meet the fluid and unpredictable threat
from non-state actors perpetrating terrorist activities.1 18
1. Self-Defense and Non-State Actors
The primary question is whether the strike in Yemeni territory
against non-state actors can be justified by invoking the U.S.' right to
self-defense. The first area of consideration is the jurisprudence of the
ICJ. On one hand, the more traditional, restrictive approach is the
position adopted by the majority in two significant cases. In both the
NicaraguaCase1 l 9 and the Wall Advisory Opinion,'2 0 the ICJ held that
self-defense must be in response to an armed attack attributable either

115. U.N. Charter, art. 51.
116. Daniel Bethlehem, PrinciplesRelevant to the Scope of a State's Right
of Self-Defence Against an Imminent or Actual Armed Attack by Non-State
Actors 106 AM. J. INT'L L. 770, 769-777, 773 (2012); GRAY, supra note 101, at
201.
117. See, e.g., BROWNLIE'S, supra note 106, at 773.
118. See, e.g., Bethlehem, supra note 117, at 773; CHRISTOPHER
GREENWOOD, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE PRE-EMPTIVE USE OF FORCE:
AFGHANISTAN, AL-QAIDA AND IRAQ, 4 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 7, 17 [hereinafter
PRE-EMPTIVE USE OF FORCE].

119. Nicaragua, supra note 101, at 103, para. 195 (noting that "The Court
sees no reason to deny that, in customary law, the prohibition of armed attacks
may apply to the sending by a State of armed bands to the territory of another
State, if such an operation, because of its scale and effects, would have been
classified as an armed attack rather than as a mere frontier incident had it been
carried out by regulars armed forces") (emphasis added).
120. Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 43, 139.
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directlyl 2 1 or indirectlyl 22 to a State.

This article takes the position
that Yemen did not attack the United States or provide any support to
AQAP. Based on this position, there is no rational argument about
attribution, and under this view there could be no possibility of
invoking self- defense.
However, jurists have shown distaste for the superficial treatment

given to the question in the Wall Opinion,123 which simply states that
"Article 51 of the Charter thus recognizes the existence of an inherent
right of self-defense in the case of armed attack by one State against
another State,"l 24 with no further reasoning. In the Wall Opinion,
Judges Higgins, 125 Kooijmans1 26 and Buergenthal12 7 challenged the
majority, with Buergenthal stating that Article 51 "does not make its
exercise dependent upon an armed attack by another State,"1 28 and
that the Security Council, in reaffirming the right, never placed this
limit.129 Judge Kooijmans once again argued the merits of his position
in his Separate Opinion to DemocraticRepublic of Congo v. Uganda,
stating that "it would be unreasonable to deny the attacked state the
right to self-defense merely because there is no attacker State, and the

121. Articles 4 and 5 of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts define when the conduct of a state organ or persons
exercising governmental authority will be directly attributed to the state. Draft
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res.
56/83, UN GAOR, 56th Sess. Supp. No. 10 at 43, U.N. Doc. A/56/83 (Dec. 12,
2001).
122. Conduct of person or group of persons under direction or control of
state. Id. art. 8.
123. BROWNLIE'S, supra note 106, at 771; lain Scobbie, Words My Mother
Never Taught Me - "In Defence of the International Court", 99 AJIL 76, 87
(2005); see also Sean Murphy, Self-Defense and the Israeli Wall Advisory
Opinion - An Ipse Dixit from the Court?, 99 AJIL 62, 62 (2005); GRAY, supra
note 101, at 135.
124. Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 43, at 139 (emphasis added).
125. Id.
33-34 (separate opinion of Judge Higgins).
126. Id. 35 (separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans).
127. Id. 6 (declaration of Judge Buergenthal).
128. Id.
129. Id. (referencing S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001) and
S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sep. 28,2001).
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Charter does not so require;"130 even though the majority of the Court
sidestepped the issue.13 1
ICJ jurisprudence is not conclusive on the right of self-defense
against

non-state

actors,

highlighting

the

need

for

further

investigation. It is thus instructive to consider whether there is the
necessary uniformity of state practice and opinio juris to support the
existence of a right to self-defense against non-state actors under
customary international law. Historically, the customary right of selfdefense derives from the Caroline incident of 1837. 132 In this incident,
British subjects destroyed the Caroline after discovering it was
providing arms and supplies to Canadian rebels. Therefore, there is
clear evidence to show that prior to the Charter era the right of selfdefense against non-state actors was accepted by states such as the
United Kingdom and United States. 133 While Nicaraguaclearly stated
that "it cannot .. . be held that article 51 is a provision which
"subsumes and supervenes" customary international law," 134
questions remain as to whether the original scope of the right survived
the passing of the U.N. Charter.135
In the Charter era prior to 9/11, State practice against non-state
actors has been portrayed to be sparse and generally negative,1 36
noting only a handful of notable incidents, such as the U.S. strike
against Libya in 1986 in response to the Libyan- sponsored terrorist
attacks on U.S. nationals abroad, 137 and the U.S. missile strikes
against Iraq in 1993 in response to a failed assassination attempt on
130. Armed Activities, supra note 107, 1 30 (separate opinion of Judge
Kooijmans).
131. The majority reasoned that its consideration was not necessary
following a conclusion on the attribution of armed attacks to the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. Id. $$ 146-147. This has led some to argue that the selfdefense against non-state actors is not necessarily precluded in the eyes of the
court. Wong, supra note 4, at 136.
132. R.Y. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AJIL 82 (1938);
Shaw, supra note 106, at 1131.
133.

PRE-EMPTIVE USE OF FORCE, supranote 119, at 17.

134. Nicaragua, supra note 100, 176.
135. The U.N. Charter passed into force on Oct. 29, 1945.
supra note 60.
136.

U.N. Charter,

BROWNLIE'S, supra note 106, at 772.

137. GRAY, supra note 101, at 196 (noting that the U.S. strikes in Libya were
in response to the Libyan-sponsored terrorist attacks on U.S. nationals abroad).
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George Bush.13 8 However, notwithstanding the paucity of practice,
neither of these incidents received condemnation for being against
non-state actors, but for other grounds, such as the former being

disproportionate.1 39
The catalyst for State action against non-state actors was 9/11.
However, State practice has been primarily that of the United States,
carrying out full military operations against non-state actors in
Afghanistan and Iraq, alongside drone strikes in Yemen, Pakistan, and
Somalia. The United States views 9/11 as an armed attack to which it
is entitled to respond with force. 140 Similar supporting opiniojuriscan
be identified in the response of the international community. In the
period following the attacks, the UN General Assembly emphatically
condemned the attack 14 1 and the Security Council has on two
occasions, in Resolutions 1368142 and 1373,143 recognized the U.S.'
right to defend itself.144 Additionally, the North American Treaty
Organization ("NATO") recognized the 9/11 terrorist attacks as an
armed attack,145 and for the first time in its history declared NATO's
right of collective self-defense.146
Whether such State practice and opinio juris is conclusive
evidence of the customary right of self-defense against non-state
actors is a matter of interpretation. Even conceding that the pre-9/1 1
State practice is inconclusive, regarding the legality of attacks against
non-state actors, there are unique arguments about the instant

138. Id. at 196-97 (noting the U.S. missile strikes were in response to a failed
assassination attempt on then President George Bush).
139. BROWNLIE'S, supra note 106, at 772.
140. See NSS 2002, supra note 74, at 15.
141. General Assembly Res. 56/1 (2001).
142. S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 130 ("[rjecognizing the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense in accordance with the Charter").
143. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 130.
144. Thomas Franck, EditorialComments: Terrorism and the Right ofSelfDefense, 95 AJIL 839, 840 (2001).
145. NATO Press Release, Statement by the North Atlantic Council
(Sept.12, 2001), available at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/pOl-124e.htm.
146. GRAY, supra note 101, at 193.
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crystallizationl 47 of customary international law on 9/11, or in the
weeks following 9/11 where the Security Council recognized the right
of self-defense against non-state actors; a so-called "Grotian
Moment." 4 8 It could alternatively be argued, consistent with the
North Sea ContinentalShelf case,149 that in the 10 years between 9/11
and Al-Aulaqi's killing, the rule of custom crystallized on the basis of
Article 51.
Nevertheless, since the ICJ in both Nicaragua and the Wall
Advisory Opinion held that self-defense is a right vis-a-vis States, and
other influential commentators, such as Crawford,' maintain strong
opposition, the United States may have the burden of rebutting the
majority in the Wall Opinion to establishing its right of self-defense
against non-state actors. However, there is overwhelming support
from learned jurists such as Gray,' 5 ' Franck,152 Dinstein,153
Greenwood, 15 4 PaUSt,'ss and Bethleheml 5 6 for the proposition that the
147. As with State practice, crystallization is a widespread term within
international law regarding the moment a purported "rule" of customary
international law actually becomes a rule in the sense of creating obligations.
148. Ramsden, supra note 45, at 391 (citing Michael Scharf, Seizing the
"Grotian Moment": Accelerated Formation of Customary International Law in
Times of Fundamental Change, 43 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 439 (2010)). This author
notes that the original argument of Scharf regarded a "Grotian Moment" in respect
to Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE) in International Criminal Law. Scharf, supra at
440-43. Scharf uses the term to denote "a paradigm-shifting development in which
new rules and doctrines of customary international law emerge with unusual rapidity
Id. at 439-41. The argument follows that 9/11 is such a
and acceptance."
development."
149. North Sea Continental Shelf Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 74 (providing that
"a short period of time is not necessarily, or of itself, a bar to the formation of a new
rule of customary international law on the basis of what was originally a purely
conventional rule [provided that] State practice, including that of States whose
interests are specially affected, [is] both extensive and virtually uniform").
150. BROWNLIE'S, supra note 106, at 773.
151. Albeit acknowledging that there are difficulties in establishing its
scope; GRAY, supra note 100, at 199 (also acknowledging there are difficulties in
establishing the scope of a State's right to act in self-defense).
152. Franck, supra note 145, at 840.
153. DINSTEIN, supra note 106, at 224-25.
154. PRE-EMPTIVE USE OF FORCE, supra note 119, at 17.
155. Use ofArmed Force,supra note 113, at 533-34.
156. Bethlehem, supra note 117, at 4.
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right to act in self-defense against non-state actors is established in
customary international law. 157
2.

The Parametersof Self-Defense

The parameters for invoking self-defense are derived from the
previously mentioned Caroline incident;15 8 specifically that selfdefense is only justified where there exists "a necessity of selfdefense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no
moment for deliberation .. . since the act, justified by the necessity of
self-defense, must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly within
it."l 59 As confirmed by the ICJ,160 from here we can distil the twin
pillars of necessity and proportionality. However, for the purposes of
clarity, the controversial concept of immediacy is extracted from
necessity and given separate treatment.
i.

Immediacy

Immediacy requires a temporal connection between an initial
armed attack and the exercise of self-defense.161 An armed attack is
the touchstone of self-defense.' 62 Notwithstanding the U.S.' perceived
security interests regarding threats to the United States from Al-

157. DAVID J. HARRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INT'L LAW 748 (7th ed.
2010); Farley, supra note 4, at 77; Michael N. Schmitt, "Change Direction"
2006: Israeli Operations in Lebanon and the InternationalLaw of Self-Defense,
29 MICH. J. INT'L LAW 127, 145 (2008); Christian Tams, The Use of Force

againstTerrorists,20 EJIL 359, 394 (2009).
158. Jennings, supra note 133, at 89-91; GRAY, supra note 101, at 148-49.
159. Jennings, supra note 133, at 89-91 (citing Letter from U.S. Sec'y of
State Daniel Webster to Henry S. Fox, Esq., Envoy Extraordinary and Minister
Plenipotentiary of Her Brittanic Majesty (Apr. 24, 1841), reprinted in (1857) 29
BFSP 1129,1138.
160. Nicaragua, supra note 101, at 103; Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.),
Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 161, at 183 [hereinafter "Oil Platforms"]; Armed Activities,
supra note 107, at 223.
161. Lubell, supra note 8, at 44; Franck, supra note 144, at 840 (arguing
that it is contrary to logic and inconsistent with the travaux preparatoiresof the
U.N. Charter to argue that the right to self-defense ended on September 11, 2001
after the armed attack ended).
162. DINSTEIN, supra note 106, at 193.
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Qaeda, unless the initial attack reaches the standard of an "armed
attack," the ensuing response is not justified in self-defense.' 63
In Nicaragua,164it was stated that to constitute an "armed attack,"
the attack must constitute more than a "mere frontier incident." 65
Absent further judicial pronouncements, there is a strong argument
that this standard could be transferred to situations of self-defense.1 66
It is clear that the acts of terrorism perpetrated by Al-Qaeda on 9/11
qualify as an "armed attack." 67 However, there are inherent
difficulties with relying on such an attack.
First, immediacy is not synonymous with "instant" 6 8 and
effective military deployment requires time. 169
Despite this,
commentators argue that, for example, even drone strikes perpetrated
in 2002 lacked the imminence to justify self-defense.' 70 Therefore, a
strike ten years after the initial armed attack struggles to qualify as
self-defense.
Second, there are fundamental difficulties in establishing a nexus
between the original armed attacks of Al-Qaeda, namely the attacks
against the USS Cole and 9/11, and Al-Aulaqi or AQAP in Yemen.
For example, AQAP has been described as a separate entity from the
central Al-Qaeda.' 7 1 Furthermore, while Judicial Watch, an NGO
163. Armed Activities, supra note 107, at 223-24.
164. Nicaragua, supra note 101.
165. Id. at 101, 103; Oil Platforms, supra note 161, at 186-87.
166. Lubell, supra note 8, at 49-50; Cf. DINSTEIN, supra note 106, at 212,
who argues that even some frontier incidents, resulting in the loss of lives or
other serious consequences, should constitute an armed attack. This article
respectfully responds to Dinstein with the argument that a lower standard would
be inconsistent with the purposes of Article 2(4).
167. GRAY, supra note 101, at 202. The attacks received condemnation
from the Security Council on two separate occasions. See S.C. Res. 1368, supra
note 129 & S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 130.
168. As per the original Caroline Test. Jennings, supra note 133, at 89-91.
169. Franck cites the UK exercise of self-defense in the Falklands/Malvinas
as an example of time needed to deploy military forces effectively. Franck, supra
note 145, at 840.
170. E.g. Downes, supra note 113, at 286 (rejecting the right of selfdefense in relation to the 2002 Yemen strike against the alleged perpetrators of
the USS Cole attack).
171. Farley, supra note 4, at 59; U.S. Department of State, Country Reports
of Terrorism 2011 (July 31, 2012), http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2011/
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advocating high standards of ethics in political and judicial activity,
recently released a document suggesting that Al-Aulaqi bought flight
tickets for the 9/11 hijackers, the United States has strongly refuted
such claims, particularly noting that the document was highly
redacted.17 2 While the evidentiary value of such document is weak,
the U.S. justification provides an opportunity to navigate around such
underlying difficulties by relying on Al-Qaeda's continuing intent to
attack.'7"
Due to the difficulties in attribution noted directly above, the
following analysis focuses on the AQAP's continuing intent to attack
the U.S. AQAP's continuing intent is evidenced by incidents such as
the 2009 Christmas Day attempted "Shoe-bombing." 74 Attacks such
as this give the U.S. its strongest claim of invoking self-defense to
justify its killing of Al-Aulaqi.
AQAP's continued intent to attack the U.S. was consequently
used to support the addition of Al-Aulaqi to a presidentially
authorized "kill list" in April 2010, leading to his eventual death in
September 2011. This "continuing intent" justification holds that the
United States is acting to prevent future attacks against U.S. persons
and interests from Al-Qaeda's "continuing intent" to attack the United
States. The main controversy is that this justification requires the
acceptance of the much-disputed concept of "anticipatory selfdefense" and potentially the further controversial "pre-emptive selfdefense." This article endorses the distinction that anticipatory action
is taken "with a specific event that is known to be approaching," and

195553.htm#AQ; John Rollins, Summary to Cong. Research Serv., R41070, AlQaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global Presence and Implications
for US Policy (2011), http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/156542.pdf.
172. Catherine Herridge, FBI refutes claims it suspected al-Awlaki role in
purchasing 9/11
hijackers' tickets, Fox News,
Jan. 4, 2013,
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/01/04/fbi-refutes-claims-it-suspected-alawlaki-role-in-purchasing-I1-hijackers/.
173. DOJ White Paper, supra note 32, at 8.
174. The Congressional Research Service notes that recently "AQAP has
targeted the U.S Embassy in Sana'a and the Saudi royal family, and has made at
least two unsuccessful attempts to bomb airlines over U.S. airspace (Christmas
Day 2009, Parcel bombs October 2010)." However, it is noted that the Sana'a
embassy attack was in September 2012. SHARP, supra note 111, at 8.
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pre-emptive action is that "taken in the absence of information of a
specific future event." 175
While the Caroline test1 76 clearly legitimizes the use of
anticipatory self- defense,177 a deep divide has permeated legal
discussion for the past century regarding whether this form of the right
survived into the Charter-era. Read literally, Article 51 is contingent
on the occurrence of an "armed attack," and jurists such as
Crawford 78 and Brownliel 79 believe that Articles 2(4) and 51 are
necessarily exhaustive to prevent the proliferation of unilateral force.
This view is supported by the travaux preparatoires of the U.N.
Charter, which commentators claim considered neither anticipatory
nor pre-emptive self-defense.' 8 0
In contrast, there is strong support' 8 ' for the proposition that
anticipatory self-defense in response to an imminent armed attack is
still recognized under customary international law, with proponents
arguing that the Caroline test has survived into the Charter-era.1 82 The

175. Lubell, supra note 8, at 55.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 132-35.
177. Jennings, supra note 134, at 89-91 (legitimizing self-defense where the
government shows "a necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no
choice of means, and no moment for deliberation") Id. at 89.
178.

BROWNLIE'S, supra note 106, at 750.

179.

IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND USE OF FORCE BY STATES,

112-13(lsted. 1963).
180. Albrecht Randelzhofer, Article 51, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS, A COMMENTARY, 661-78, 675-76 (Bruno Simma ed., 1994). Although, it

is noted such a reference has been removed from the current commentary. Albrecht
Randelzhofer and Georg Nolte, Article 51, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS, A COMMENTARY, 1397-1428, 1421-24 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 3d ed.,

2012).
181.

Christopher

Greenwood,

Self

ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,

Defence,

in

MAX

PLANCK

T 45 [hereinafter Self Defence].

182. Derek Bowett, Self-Defence in InternationalLaw 188-89 (1958). The
UK Government also supported the customary formulation of self-defense surviving
following the UN Charter, although only to the extent of self-defense against an
imminent threat. 660 PARL. DEB., H.L. (6th Ser.) (2004) 356, 370 (U.K.)
at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200304/ldhansrd/
available
[hereinafter PARL. DEB];
07.htm#40421-07_head0
vo040421/text/40421Bethlehem, supra note 117, at 4.
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UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 183 and the
UN Secretary General support this proposition. 184
Notwithstanding, there is still opposition to absolute confirmation
of the doctrine from distinguished academics such as Gray"' and
Greenwood. 186
These academics note that the World Summit
Outcome adopted by the General Assembly in 2005187 and the ICJ are
silent on the subject. 88
After documenting the continued controversy over anticipatory
self-defense, it is not surprising that the doctrine of pre-emptive selfdefense has received widespread disapproval.189 Generally, there is a
negative attitude about this doctrine, identifiable in State practice,190
opinio juris,'91 and jurist opinions. 192 This negative attitude is
attributable to the fear, enunciated by the UN Secretary General, that
183. U.N. Secretary-General, High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and
Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility,
188-192, U.N.
Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004) [hereinafter "High-Level Panel"].
184. UN Secretary-General, In Larger Freedoms: Towards Development,
Security and Human RightsforAll, 125, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005).
185. GRAY, supra note 101, at 165.
186. SelfDefence, supra note 182, 50.
187. UN General Assembly, World Summit Outcome, UN Doc.
A/Res/60/1, Oct. 24, 2005.
188. Nicaragua, supra note 101, paras. 35, 194; Armed Activities, supra
note 106, at 222.
189. Also referred to as the "Bush Doctrine." See supra part I.
190. One pertinent example is the Israel bombing of Iraq's Osirak nuclear
facility in 1982, where the international community rejected Israel's invocation of
self-defense against an attack that was merely hypothetical; Farley, supra note
4, at 82.
191. The UK position is that "international law permits the use of force in
self-defense against an imminent attack, but does not authorize the use of force to
mount a pre-emptive strike against a threat that is more remote." PARL. DEB,
supra note 183, at 370.
192. Lubell, supra note 8, at 62; Bethlehem, supra note 117, at 3;
Randelzhofer, supra note 181, at 1423; see also Rosalyn Higgins, The Attitude of
Western States Towards Legal Aspects of the Use of Force, in THE CURRENT
LEGAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE 435, 441 (Antonio Cassese ed.,

1986); Elizabeth Wilmshurst, Principles of InternationalLaw on the Use of
Force by States in Self-Defence (Chatham House, Working Paper Series 8-9,
2005); BROWNLIE'S, supra note 106, at 752; GRAY, supra note 101, at 164-65;
Thorpe, supra note 100, at 10.
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preemption may result in disregarding the jus cogens' prohibition on
force.193 Therefore, this article argues that pre-emptive self-defense is
unlawful under the lex lata, even against the challenging and fluid
concept of non-state actors.1 94
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that anticipatory self-defense
is legal, the justifiability of the Al-Aulaqi strike under the parameter
of imminence requires an analysis of whether the strike was
anticipatory or preemptive. It may be that the United States was
acting to prevent a specific armed attack that Al-Aulaqi was en-route
to performing when Hellfire missiles hit his jeep. But, the United
States has not disclosed this information.1 95 Logically speaking, if
such intelligence existed, capable of exculpating the United States,
surely this would have been publicly stated by the administration.
Because specific details of the strike on Al-Aulaqi have not been
revealed, we must look to the general justification for "targeted
killings" provided by the DOJ White Paper's conception of
"imminence." This conception "does not require clear evidence that a
specific attack on U.S. persons and interests will take place in the
immediate future."' 96
If "clear evidence" is taken as the operative phrase, it could be
argued that the United States had some evidence of a specific attack
approaching, but not concrete evidence. This may be justifiable under
anticipatory self-defense. However, the addition of Al-Aulaqi to the
"kill list" months before the U.S. strike against him militates against a
finding that the United States had any evidence of a "specific event
known to be approaching." 97 This final fact of adding Al-Aulaqi to
the "kill list" months before may provide evidence of the strike
crossing into the unlawful realm of pre-emptive self-defense.
However, in lieu of concrete facts regarding the attack and the
intelligence behind it, this article can merely speculate and extrapolate
arguments from the U.S. policy.

193. High-LevelPanel, supra note 184,
188-192.
194. Randelzhofer, supra note 181, at 1423.
195. Lubell makes a similar argument in relation to the 2002 strike against
the alleged perpetrators of the USS Cole incident. Lubell, supra note 8, at 177.
196. DOJ White Paper, supra note 32, at 7.
197. Lubell, supra note 8, at 55.
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Necessity

In addition to imminence of an armed attack, necessity requires
that the United States "must have no other option in the circumstances
than to act in forceful self-defense."' 98 Regarding the Al-Aulaqi
strike, this means that the United States exhausted all means to
prevent an imminent armed attack, including entering diplomatic
discussions with Yemen to ask the state for either consent to strike, or
to exercise Yemen's own jurisdiction by apprehending Al-Aulaqi.
However, the United States states that where diplomatic efforts are
made, but the territorial state is "unwilling or unable" to prevent
further threats emanating from its territory, force is legitimate under
international law.1 99 Some commentators struggle to find a place for
the United States' "unwilling or unable" doctrine. 200 However, this
"unwilling or unable" doctrine was taken as grounded in international
law as an element of necessity, even prior to 9/11.201
In applying this doctrine, it must first be noted that Yemen was
certainly "willing" to bring Al-Aulaqi to justice, placing him on trial
in absentia202 and was actively pursuing him. 203 However, a question
198. BROWNLIE'S, supra note 106, at 749; see also Nicaragua, supra note
101, at para. 267; Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility, The internationally
wrongful act of the State, source of internationalresponsibility (Part1) (concluded),
Int'l Law Comm'n, U.N. Doc A/CN.4/318/Add. 5-7, at 69, para. 120 (1980) (by
Robert Ago) ("The reason for stressing that action taken in self-defence must be
necessary is that the State attacked ... must not, in the particular circumstances,
have had any means of halting the attack other than recourse to armed force.")
199. DOJ White Paper, supra note 32, at 5.
200. ELSEA, supra note 34, at 7-8 (concluding that it is not clear whether the
test is "separate from the Caroline test, an additional consideration, or a
substitute for one of the factors, perhaps immediacy in the case of a continuing
threat.").
201. Randelzhofer, supra note 181, at 673; see also Ashley Deeks,
PAKISTAN'S SOVEREIGNTY AND THE KILLING OF OSAMA BIN LADEN, 15(11) ASIL

Insights 5 (2011); Bethlehem, supra note 117, at 7.
202. Hamza Hendawi & Ahmed Al-Haj, Yemen Charges U.S. Born Muslim
Radical Cleric Al-Awlaki, WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 2, 2010, at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/02/AR20101
10200458.html
203. Yemen OrdersArrest of U.S.-Born Radical Cleric Awlaki, Fox NEWS,
Nov. 6, 2013, at http://www.foxnews.com/world/2010/11/06/yemen-ordersarrest-bom-radical-cleric-awlaki/.
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remains as to whether Yemen was able to effectively deal with the
threat posed by Al-Aulaqi.
In 2011, Yemen was an economically weak state. 204 In terms of
governmental power, 20 5 Yemen faced the uprising dubbed the "Arab
Spring." 206 Furthermore, it had failed on multiple occasions to
prevent Al-Qaeda's attempts to attack the United States, namely the
failed 2009 Detroit Christmas Day shoe-bomber 207 and the 2010
"parcel bomb" plot. 208 Because of Yemen's status as a weak state, its
previous failures to prevent Al-Qaeda's attempts to attack the U.S.,
and in lieu of further guidance from international law on the unwilling
or unable doctrine,209 an argument could cogently be made that the
strike against Al-Aulaqi was necessary.
Proportionality

iii.

Proportionality is an elusive concept because it is a contextspecific term, with nuances attributable to its particular usage under
jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and the IHRL. 210 Because this chapter
concerns jus ad bellum, proportionality requires balancing the action
taken by the state in self-defense, with the means necessary to end an

204. The World Bank identified Yemen's 2011 GDP per capita at $2,333.
World Bank, Yemen Republic: Data at http://data.worldbank.org/country/yemenrepublic.
205. Id. Albeit not classified as a failed state, Yemen was ranked as the
thirteenth most critical state in the world by Foreign Policy. The 2012 Failed
States

Index

-

Interactive

Map

and

Rankings,

FOREIGN

POLICY,

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/failed_states index_2012_interactive.
206. SHARP, supra note 110, at 4. ("[A] youth-led popular demonstration
movement [that] challenged President Saleh's rule in Yemen.")"
207. Sanctions Comm., supra note 21. This failed attack involved a man
attempting to ignite an explosive device while aboard a Trans-Atlantic Northwest
Airlines Flight scheduled to land in Detroit. Id.
208. Erika Solomon, et al., Al-Qaeda Yemen wing claims parcel plot, UPS
crash, REUTERS, Nov. 5, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/11/05/us-usayemen-bomb-idUSTRE6A44PU20101105. This incident involved the airfreight
of two bombs sent from Yemen to the United States. The devices did not
detonate because UK authorities in Dubai intercepted and defused the bombs.
Id.
209. Thorpe, supra note 100, at 11.
210. DINSTEIN, supra note 106, at 232.
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ongoing danger,2 1 1 with the requirement that the action be directed
specifically at the non-state actor, as opposed to any installations
belonging to Yemen. 2 12
In the case of Al-Aulaqi, the strike was specifically targeted
against the jeep in which he was known to be traveling, in order to end
the on-going danger he personally posed. The UN accepted the
designation of Al-Aulaqi as a senior operational leader of Al-Qaeda,
noting his involvement in the attempted 2009 shoe-bombing attempt
against the United States. 2 13 Therefore, there is a strong argument to
support the proposition that the incursion into Yemeni territory, to
prevent the ongoing danger posed by Al-Aulaqi, was proportionate.
D. Conclusion
The framework of jus ad bellum appears to be undergoing a
paradigm shift since the armed attack perpetrated by Al-Qaeda on
9/11. While Article 2(4) appears to have retained its status as a
cornerstone of international law, the traditional view of the exhaustive
nature of Article 51 is slowly dissipating under the pressure from
those favoring a progressive interpretation, particularly following
9/11, to allow anticipatory self-defense directed at non-state actors.
Such views appear to be well-founded in the customary right to selfdefense existing parallel to the Charter. However, great debate
remains, consequently preventing the confirmation of the progressive

approach.
The scarcity of publicly available information surrounding the AlAulaqi killing provides difficulties in the application of the selfdefense parameters. However, strong arguments can be deduced,
from known facts and the U.S. legal justifications, to conclude that it
would be difficult for the United States to justify the strike under the
rules of jus ad bellum, particularly on the basis of the criteria of
imminence to an armed attack. In lieu of a statement by United States
211. Lubell, supra note 8, at 65; BROWNLIE'S, supra note 106, at 749; Self
Defence, supranote 182, at paras. 27-28.
212. Oil Platforms, supra note 161, at 198 (holding that even if the U.S.
could have invoked self-defense to justify the attack on Iranian oil platforms,
the attack would have been disproportionate as there was no link between an
armed attack and the oil platforms).
213. Sanctions Comm., supra note 21.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2013

33

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 44, No. 1 [2013], Art. 3

72

CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 44

or Yemeni officials revealing the intelligence behind the strike, or
whether Yemen consented to the strike, the issue remains shrouded in
uncertainty.
CONCLUSION

Part I of this two-part article sought to lay the foundations for this
article's proposition, via an analysis of the legal justifications for
targeted killing forwarded by the United States, before addressing the
first set of legal issues identified under the framework of jus ad
bellum. However, the most divisive issues surrounding the targeted
killing of Anwar Al-Aulaqi are to be explored in Part II of this article,
which will address the remaining frameworks of jus in bello and
IHRL. The analysis in Part II develops the overall thesis proposed by
this author, namely that the targeted killing of Anwar Al-Aulaqi must
be evaluated under both the rules of jus ad bellum and the "law
enforcement" paradigm of IRL. The implications of the analysis
propounded in Part II are great: if the rules of jus in bello dictate that
the stricter "law enforcement" paradigm of IHRL is to apply to
targeted killings in States such as Yemen and Pakistan, serious
questions surround the use of "targeted killing" as a tool in the arsenal
of the United States in their war against Al-Qaeda. Such operations
would be subject to the restrictive requirement to respect the right to
life, and there would be no room for collateral damage. In sum, the
large majority of drone strikes would be unlawful. In applying these
two frameworks, a final conclusion will be reached with regards to the
legality of the strike against Al-Aulaqi.
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